AMERICAN INTRIGUES IN ST. DOMINGO. NO. 1.

To the Editor of the Anti-Slavery Reporter.'

SIR,—The island of St. Domingo, once united under the firm administration of Boyer for a period of twenty-two years, is now divided into two parts; the East, or Spanish part, forming the Dominican Republic, and the West, or French part, being constituted into the empire of Soulouque. It is not, at present, my intention to enter into the history of the civil war in the eastern province which led to the separation, nor is it necessary to show to any one who has studied the recent history of the country, that this separation has occasioned much present weakness and past ruin to both, and surrounded both with perils of incalculable magnitude. The existence of two independent states on so small an island, necessarily influenced by mutual jealousies and hatreds, and each looking to foreign aid for protection against a foreign power and a revolted province, could not fail to invite foreign aggression and intrigue. The great representatives of England, France, Spain, and the United States, have, in turn, taken advantage of the weakness of the local governments to play the game of their respective countries, but the aggressions of the latter power appear to have been influenced by the most evil motives, and to have a direct tendency to encourage new attacks on the liberty and independence of the island. These intrigues doubtless form a part of a systematic plan of American encroaching policy, holding propaganda, which aims to extend the ‘blessings of the peculiar institution’ over Hayti, Central America, and Cuba. The first-fruits of American diplomacy in the Dominican Republic were gathered in 1854, when, by dint of intrigues with Santana, the President, and, as it is asserted, heavy bribes to the petty representatives of the Dominican Republic, the United States’ Commissioner, General Cazneau, obtained the cession of Navaza, in the splendid peninsula bay of Samana, together with other privileges to which I need not more particularly allude, further than to say that they included a right to establish factories on land and to construct railways to the interior, and, in short, to work mines. This object of this treaty was, doubtless, to allure large numbers of American adventurers into the country, who, dazzled by the certainty of immediate profit and the prospect of far more substantial rewards, would form a powerful nucleus. Fortunately, this plot was not carried out, owing, in a great measure, to the exertions of the French and English Consuls, who, by showing to the Dominican Congress the danger of making such important concessions to the United States, prevented its ratification. The agent of General Santana, however, still refused to encourage American interests, and shortly afterwards the invasion of Dominican territory in 1855 by the Emperor Soulouque, whose fears were not unnaturally excited by the prospect of an American occupation of St. Domingo. This war turned out to be disastrous to Santana, however, which took place in 1856, when he was compelled to resign the presidential office amid the execrations of his countrymen. In his flight through the streets of San Domingo, *A bas le tyran! A bas les Americains!* rang from every lip. Baez, the former President, was compelled to leave the country; but he returned after a short absence, and by decree of the Senate succeeded in capturing the city of San Domingo, and restoring himself to power.

It is not difficult to discover what political advantages the possession of territorial rights in the Dominican Republic, together with the important bay of Samana, would have conferred upon the Americans; nor is it more difficult to see that, had it come to pass, they would have been able to prevent that union of the two sections of the island which alone can give a fair chance of success to the great experiment of negro self-government, and thereby prove the falseness of those theories of the natural and inherent inferiority of the African race, which form the sole justification for American slavery. This would have given them a pretext, of which they would not have been slow to avail themselves, to interfere by force in the domestic affairs of the whole island; and if no worse result happened, they would, at least, have placed the Haytian Government and Dominican President in a position of abject dependence upon the United States; while the bay of Samana might have formed a point from which to carry on filibustering operations against Cuba, and even our West India possessions; thus giving a new lease of life to slavery, if not a new field of action. No doubt all these considerations were well weighed by the Cabinet of Washington in instructions to their commissioners, and by Santana and his confederates bought with American gold, and to whose standard every enemy of his country seemed by destiny to rally. Happily, however, the temporary overthrow of Santana put an end to these projects, or at least suspended their execution; but their revival is not unlikely, now that Santana, by the defeat of Baez, has been restored to power. General Cazneau, it is true, has retired from the scene, but his party still continues in the ascendant at Washington, and Mr. Buchanan, like his predecessor, is its creature and instrument, rather than its director.

That a change of Presidents in the United States has produced no change of policy is but too evident from the proceeding of Mr. Buchanan in regard to the island of Navaza. This island, which forms a part of the Dominican territory, is small and uninhabited, situated between the south-western extremity of Hayti and the island of Jamaica, and is about thirty miles from Cape Tiburon. That the island belongs to Hayti is proved by incontrovertible historical evidence. A French authority, Moreau de St. Mery, is agreed on this point. Herrera says, in his ‘Descripcion de las Occidentales,’ chap. vi. p. 7, Madrid, 1730:—‘The harbors, &c., and the isles belonging to the coast of that island (Hispaniola) are found several small isles that are annexed to her, and that may still be very useful to her. The most considerable are the Saona besides Navaza and Mona, the first being ten leagues from Cape Tiburon towards Jamaica.’ Several months ago the Haytian Government learnt that this island, which contains extensive deposits of guano, had been invaded by a party of American adventurers, who had established themselves there for the purpose of digging and exporting the guano, without making any attempt to obtain the permission of the authorities at Port-au-Prince. The Haytian Government immediately forwarded a statement of the facts of the case to the Cabinet at Washington, soliciting their intervention as a medium of communication with the American adventurers occupying Navaza, because, up to the present time, no diplomatic relations had been established between the two countries. They also dispatched two Commissioners to Navaza to report upon the actual state of affairs in the island. The Commissioners, on their return, reported that they discovered on the northern side of the island three distinct establishments for the exportation of guano. This establishment consisted of about fifty persons, together with a wharf, boats, and houses, and two four-pounders. The whole party was under the management of Mr. John L. Frazier, who acted as agent for the officers of an association at Baltimore which had entered into a treaty with the leaders of the pirate party in the Caribbean Sea, for the exportation of guano from such of them as might be found to contain that valuable manure. It is scarcely necessary to say that no such treaty had ever been made with the Haytian Government, and that Mr. Frazier’s statement was an invention of his own.

As might be expected, the remonstrances of the Haytian Government have failed to produce any effect upon the American Cabinet. The protest sent through the American commercial agent was answered by Mr. Cass to the effect that the President had ordered the appearance, at Port au Prince, of two American men-of-war. The American commodore notified to the Haytian Government that he had not come to vindicate the sovereign rights of Hayti, but to raise the flag of the United States, and protect the intruders at Navaza, who, he alleged, had a clear right by virtue of an Act of Congress passed on the 18th of August, 1856, which authorized the President to protect American citizens who may discover guano on any island not within the lawful jurisdiction of any other Government. The Haytian commodore, not being empowered to discuss the question,—for in all likelihood, the very size of his vessel formed the principal reason why he was susceptible of too easy a proof—sailed off without making any reply. The Haytian Government have addressed a new protest to Washington, and there, for the present, the matter rests. It will be remembered that this is not the first case of a similar difficulty that arose between the United States and Peru, when the island of Lobos was invaded by a party of American citizens. Then the Cabinet at Washington was compelled, after a brief show of bluster, to respect the rights of Peru. Why, then, should America treat Peru with respect, and refuse to render equal justice towards Hayti? The reason would certainly appear to be, either that she cares no longer to recognize the rights of weak nations, or that, in the particular case of Hayti, she has ulterior designs to accomplish. It is certainly more than probable that this aggression, like most others of a similar character, has for its ultimate object, not the mere possession of guano, which, according to report, is of such an inferior quality, that it was impossible to find a market, and the vessel in which it was loaded was compelled to take it back again, thereby involving the speculators in a serious loss. But although America may not be able to turn the guano of Navaza to profitable account, she may, nevertheless, retain possession of the island for more important purposes. What could be easier than for her to erect on the island a small fort, and garrison it with soldiers? or to use it as a coaling station for American steamers? But whether the act of 1856 be made by America or not, the principle involved in the question remains precisely the same: If an American is allowed to retain possession of Navaza without protest, what is to prevent him from seizing on the numerous other islands which dot the Haytian coast, and, under similar pretexts, erect a fort upon such of them as he may please to occupy?

Clearly it is the duty of England to interpose her powerful influence, and to exert all the influence she can exert, to protect the rights of a feeble ally. St. Domingo may have fallen, and Hayti may have fallen, under the hand of Lord Malmesbury; but as this is necessarily a matter of truth and importance to humanity, we cannot but hope that the influence of Lord Brougham and of other distinguished friends of the negro in both Houses of Parliament, will be exercised to accomplish this most desirable object.

With your permission, in a future communication I shall call attention to another and a later phase which American designs against St. Domingo have assumed.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

F. W. CHESSON.